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[L. A. No. 23791. In Bank. Mar. 2, 1956.} 
PEARL C. HOPKINS, Appellant, v. GUY B. 
HOPKINS, Respondent. 
[1] Divorce-Foreign Decrees-Enforcement.-A divorce decree of 
a sister state incorporating a property settlement agreement 
requiring the husband to pay a certain sum in lieu of all 
payments of alimony and support money and byway of support 
and maintenance of the parties' children, but not segregating 
the amounts attributable to the wife and to the children, was 
not, after the children reached majority, so uncertain as to be 
incapable of enforcement in California, since the courts of 
this state could, without first resubmitting the decree to the 
court of its origin for modification, determine the proportion 
of the total support obligation attributable to the wife. (Dis-
approving Kahn v. Kahn, 123 Cal.App.2d 819 [268 P.2d 151].) 
[2] ld.-Foreign Decrees-Modifl.cation.-Wbere a divorce decree 
of a sister state incorporating a property settlement agreement 
required the husband to pay a certain sum in lieu of all 
[1] See CaJ.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 312 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 740 et seq. 
MeX. Die. References: [1, 2] Divorce, § 305 j [3] Divorce, § 203. 
) 
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payments of alimony and support money and by way of support 
and maintenance. of the parties' children, but did not segregate 
t.he amounts attributable t.o the wife and t.o the children, the 
wife's contractual right to receive her proportionate share of , 
the monthly payment under such decree, after the children . 
reached majority, was not subject to modification by the Su-
preme Court of California or by any other court. 
[S] Id.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of .rreement of Parties.-
Where a property settlement agreement incorporated in a di-
vorce decree requires the husband to pay a certain sum in lieu 
of all payments of alimony and support money and by way 
of support and maintenance of the parties' children without 
segregating the amounts attributable t.o the wife and t.o the 
children, and also provides that in the event the wife should 
remarry the husband's obligation should be limited t.o the 
proportionate part of the monthly payment that is "reasonably 
necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of their 
said children as long as said children or any of them remains 
a minor," the meaning of the quoted provision may be ascer-
tained by looking t.o the subsequent acts and declarations of 
the parties. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Alfred L. Bartlett, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to collect accrued arrearages under a divorce judg-
ment of a sister state. Judgment for defendant reversed. 
Courtney A. Teel for Appellant. 
George B. Bush for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action in September 
1950 to collect the accrued arrearages not barred by the 
statute of limitations (see Hopkins v. Hopkins, 116 Cal.A.pp. 
2d 174 [253 P.2d 723]) under a 1927 Colorado decree of 
divorce, which incorporated a property settlement agreement 
providing that defendant should pay to plaintiff "in lieu of 
all payments of alimony and support money, and by way of 
support and maintenance for the first party [plaintiff] and 
their said minor children, the sum of One Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($150) per month ... " in addition to certain lump-
811ID payments that were to be made within three years from 
the date of the decree of divorce. The property settlement 
agreement also provided that "If the first party hereto 
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[plaintiff] shaH at any time remarry, such re-marriage on the 
part of the party of the first part shall relieve second party 
[defe!!.dant] from the payment of any further alimony to the 
first party. But such marriage, if any such takes place, shall 
not relieve the party of the second part from the payment to 
the first party of such proportionate part of the monthly 
payments hereinbefore provided for as shall be reasonably 
necessary for the support, maintrnance, and education of their 
said children a.c; long as said children or any of them remains 
a minor and in the custody of the first party." In the present 
action, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the 
Colorado "Judgment and Decree sought to be sued upon is 
too uncertain to be sued on and is unenforceable in California" 
(c/. Kahn v. Kahn, 123 Cal.App.2d 819, 824 [268 P.2d 151]), 
and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. 
The uncertainty is said to arise from the fact that the 
property settlement agreement specifies a gross amount for 
the support of the wife and children, without segregating the 
amounts attributable to each, and that since the children have 
all reached the age of majority, defendant's obligation is lim-
ited to the support of plaintiff, who has not remarried. 
Relying on Kahn v. Kahn, 123 Ca1.App.2d 819, 823-825 [268 
P.2d 151], defendant contends that the California courts are 
"without power" to determine the proportion of the total 
support obligation attributable to plaintiff, and thus that 
defendant's obligation cannot be enforced in California until 
plaintiff obtains a determination by a Colorado court of the 
proportion of the total support obligation attributable to her. 
[1] In the Kahn case the court said that "if a wife seeks 
to recover the unpaid installments on her decree from another 
court and the amount of her award is the combined sum of 
alimony and child support and her children have attained 
their majorities and the court is unable to determine the 
portion intended for alimony as distinguished from the part 
allowed for child support, then the entire award of such decree 
is illegal and nonenforceable. [Citations.] The judgment in 
suit can serve no purpose unless it is first resubmitted to the 
court of its origin for modification." (123 Cal.App.2d at 
824.) The California cases cited as authority for that state-
ment do not support it. (See the review of those cases in 
Wilkins v. Wilkins, 95 Cal.App.2d 605, 607-611 [213 P.2d 
748]; see also Anderson v. Anderson, 129 Cal.App.2d 403, 
406-407 (276 P.2d862] [following the Wilkins case and dis-
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tinguishing the Kahn ease as applicable only to actions on 
sister-state alimony and support decrees].) Furthermore, 
although the present case differs from the Kahn case in that 
defendant's obligation has its origin in an integrated property 
settlement agreement rather than in a judicial award of 
alimony and in that there was evidence presented to the trial 
court that would enable it "to determine the portion intended 
for alimony as distinguished 'from the part allowed for child 
support," the rationale of the holding in the Kahn case is 
inconsistent with Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Ca1.2d 465 [283 
P.2d 19], and must therefore be disapproved. In the Worthley 
case this court rejected the contention that a prospectively 
and retroactively modifiable sister-state support decree is too ' 
uncertain to form the basis of an action in this state for a 
money judgment, and we held "that foreign-created alimony 
and support obligations are enforceable in this state. In an 
action to enforce a modifiable support obligation, either party 
may tender and litigate any plea for modification that could 
be presented to the courts of the state where the alimony or 
support decree was originally rendered." (44 Cal.2d at 474.) 
[2] Plaintiff's contractual right to receive her propor-
tionate share of the $150 monthly payment under the Colorado 
decree is not subject to modification by this or any other 
court (Zlaten v. Zlaten, 117 Colo. 296, 298-299 [186 P.2d 
583] ; Hall v. Hall, 105 Colo. 227, 235-239 [97 P.2d 415]; 
ct. Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 40 [265 P.2d 873]), and 
the crucial question presented to the trial court in the present 
case was to resolve the ambiguity latent in the property settle-
ment agreement by determining the proportion of defendant's 
obligation attributable to plaintiff. (See Meek v. Meek, 51 
Ca1.App.2d 492, 495 [125 P.2d 117) ; Putnam v. Putnam, 51 
Ca1.App.2d 696, 699 [125 P.2d 525J.) This proportion is 
indicated in part by the provisions of the property setth,-
ment agreement itself for it is provided therein that in the 
event plaintiff should remarry defendant's obligation should 
be limited to the proportionate part of the monthly payment 
that is "reasonably necessary for the support, maintenance. 
and education of their said children as long as said children 
or any of them remains a minor ... " [3] The meaning 
of this provision may be ascertained by looking to the subse-
quent acts and declarations of the parties (Barham v. BaHi;am. 
33 Ca1.2d 416, 423 [202 P.2d 289], and cases cited), of which 
there was evidence presented in the trial of the present case. 
) 
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The trial court should have made a finding on the basis of 
that evidence and entered judgment accordingly. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Dooling, J. pro tem.,- con· 
curred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
I am of the opinion that the trial court properly entered 
judgment for defendant, and that said judgment is in accord 
with the decision in Kahn v. Kahn, 123 Cal.App.2d 819 [268 
P.2d 151]. I would not disapprove the Kahn case, as does 
the majority opinion; and while the case of Worlhley v. 
Worthley,44 Ca1.2d 465.[283 P.2d 19], cited in the majority 
opinion, is not directly in point, I adhere to the views ex· 
pressed in my dissenting opinion in that case. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 
28, 1956. Shenk, J., Spence, J., and Schauer, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. Dooling, 
J. pro tem., participated therein in place of McComb, J. 
• A.asi~ed by Chairman of Judicial Councn. 
